Nyaya Theory of Knowledge: A Critical Study of Some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics
Language: English
Category: Ebook - Philosophy
Categories: Philosophy, Religion/Spirituality
Uploader: Raaji
Uploaded At: 2026-05-26 05:40:35
2nd Edition 2015, Nyaya, Nyāya, Indian Philosophy, Darśana, Darsana
Description
The Nyāya philosophy is primarily concerned with the conditions of valid thought and the means of acquiring true knowledge of objects. Its ultimate end, like that of the other systems of Indian philosophy, is liberation-a state of pure existence- which is free from both pleasure and pain. For the attainment of this liberation, a true knowledge of objects is the surest means. Hence the theory of knowledge is the very foundation of the Nyāya system. The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge is the first systematic, critical and comparative treatment of the Nyāya epistemology. It reveals how, as a thorough-going realistic view of the universe, the Nyāya philosophy supplies an important Eastern parallel to the triumphant modern Realism of the West, and contains anticipations of as well as possible alternatives to many contemporary realistic theories. This book is important as much for the correct understanding of ancient Indian philosophy, as for the evaluation of modern Western philosophy.
Excerpt from Introduction:
"The Nyāya philosophy is primarily concerned with the conditions of
valid thought and the means of acquiring a true knowledge of objects.
Nyāya as a science lays down the rules and methods that are essentially
necessary for a clear and precise understanding of all the materials of our
knowledge as these are derived from observation and authority. With this
end in view, the science of Nyāya deals with all the processes and methods
that are involved, either directly or indirectly, in the right and consistent
knowledge of reality...It should, however, be remarked here that the epistemological problem
as to the methods and conditions of valid knowledge is neither the sole nor
the ultimate concern of the Nyāya philosophy. Its ultimate end, like that of
the other systems of Indian philosophy, is liberation, which is the summum
bonum of our life. This highest good is conceived by the Nyāya as a state of
pure existence which is free from both pleasure and pain. For the attainment
of the highest end of our life, a true knowledge of objects is the sure and
indispensable means. Hence it is that the problem of knowledge finds an
important place in the Nyāya philosophy."
Content:
Abbreviations
Preface To The First Edition
Preface To The Second Edition
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
BOOK I: THE METHOD OF VALID KNOWLEDGE (PRAMĀṆA)
CHAPTER II: THE NATURE AND FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE
1. Definition of knowledge (buddhi)
2. Classification of knowledge
3. Memory and dream
4. Doubt (saṁśaya)
5. Error (viparyyaya)
6. Theories of illusion in Indian philosophy
7. Hypothetical argument (tarka)
CHAPTER III: VALID KNOWLEDGE AND ITS METHOD (PRAMĀ AND PRAMĀṆA)
1. Definition of pramā or valid knowledge
2. Definition of pramāṇa or the method of knowledge
3. Nyāya criticism of the Bauddha views of pramāṇa
4. Nyāya criticism of the Mīmāṁsā and Sāṅkhya views
CHAPTER IV: THE FACTORS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE (PRAMĀ)
1. The subject, object and method of valid knowledge
2. Distinction of the method from the subject and object of valid knowledge
CHAPTER V: THE TEST OF TRUTH AND ERROR
1. The problems and alternative solutions
2. The Nyāya theory of extrinsic validity and invalidity
3. Objections to the theory answered by the Nyāya
4. Criticism of the Sāṅkhya view of intrinsic validity and invalidity
5. Criticism of the Bauddha theory of intrinsic invalidity and extrinsic validity
6. Criticism of the Mīmāṁsā theory of intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity
7. Indian and Western theories of truth
BOOK II: PERCEPTION AS A METHOD OF KNOWLEDGE (PRATYAKṢA-PRAMĀṆA)
CHAPTER VI: THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION
1. Primacy of perception over other methods of knowledge
2. The Buddhist definition of perception
3. The Jaina, Prābhākara and Vedānta definitions of perception
4. The Nyāya definitions of perception
CHAPTER VII: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERCEPTION
1. The senses (indriya)
2. Function of the senses
3. The nature and function of the mind (manas)
4. The self and its function in perception
CHAPTER VIII: ORDINARY PERCEPTION AND ITS OBJECTS
1. Different kinds of perception and the categories of reality (padārtha)
2. Perception of substances or things (dravya)
3. Perception of attributes (guṇa) and actions (karma)
4. The universal (sāmānya) particularity (viśeṣa) and the relation of inherence (samavāya)
5. Perception of non-existence (abhāva)
6. Internal perception and its objects
CHAPTER IX: THREE MODES OF ORDINARY PERCEPTION
1. Nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perceptions
2. Recognition (pratyabhijñā) as a mode of perception
CHAPTER X: EXTRAORDINARY PERCEPTION (ALAUKIKA PRATYAKṢA)
1. Sāmānyalakṣaṇa or the perception of classes
2. Jñānalakṣaṇa or acquired perception
3. Yogaja or intuitive perception
BOOK III: THE THEORY OF INFERENCE (ANUMĀNA-PRAMĀṆA)
CHAPTER XI: THE NATURE OF INFERENCE
1. Definition of anumāna or inference
2. Distinction between perception and inference
3. The constituents of inference
CHAPTER XII: THE GROUNDS OF INFERENCE
1. The logical ground of vyāpti or universal relation
2. The question of petitio principii in inference
3. The psychological ground of inference (pakṣatā)
4. Liṅgaparāmarśa as the immediate cause of inference
CHAPTER XIII: CLASSIFICATION AND LOGICAL FORMS OF INFERENCE
1. Svārtha and parārtha inferences
2. Pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inferences
3. Kevalānvayi, kevala-vyatireki and anvaya-vyatireki inferences
4. The logical form of inference
CHAPTER XIV: THE FALLACIES OF INFERENCE
1. Distinction between a valid and an invalid reason
2. The fallacy of savyabhicāra or the irregular middle
3. The fallacy of viruddha or the contradictory middle
4. The fallacy of prakaraṇasama or the counteracted middle
5. The fallacy of asiddha or the unproved middle
6. The fallacies of kālātīta and bādhita or the mistimed and contradicted middles
7. The fallacies of chala, jāti and nigrahasthāna
BOOK IV: UPAMĀNA OR COMPARISON
CHAPTER XV: THE NATURE AND FORMS OF UPAMĀNA
1. The Nyāya definition of upamāna
2. The Jaina, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta views of upamāna
3. The classification of upamāna
CHAPTER XVI: UPAMĀNA AS AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE (PRAMĀṆA)
1. Can upamāna give us any valid knowledge?
2. Can upamāna be reduced to any other pramāṇa?
3. Conclusion
BOOK V: ŚABDA OR TESTIMONY
CHAPTER XVII: THE NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF ŚABDA
1. The Nyāya definition of śabda and its different kinds
2. Other systems on the nature and forms of śabda
CHAPTER XVIII: OF WORDS (PADA)
1. Sounds and words
2. Words and their meanings
3. The import of words
4. The unity of words and the hypothesis of sphoṭa
CHAPTER XIX: OF SENTENCES (VĀKYA)
1. The construction of a sentence
2. The meaning of a sentence
3. The import of sentences
4. Śabda as an independent source of knowledge
CHAPTER XX: OTHER SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE
1. Different views about the ultimate sources of knowledge
2. Arthāpatti or postulation as a source of knowledge
3. Abhāva and anupalabdhi as sources of knowledge
4. Smṛti or memory as a distinct sources of knowledge
5. Summary and general estimate of Nyāya epistemology